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Abstract 
Governments throughout the world are turning to public-private partnerships (PPPs) as a 
means of providing new infrastructure. The decision to adopt a PPP over conventional 
government procurement is usually based on a value for money (VfM) appraisal, but this 
analysis is conducted differently in different countries. This paper describes the correct way 
to conduct VfM analysis if the goal is to minimize the present value of the costs to the 
Treasury and if the goal is to maximize social welfare. It then compares the documented 
methodologies of nine specialist PPP units. It identifies four ways in which these 
methodologies depart from either of the correct approaches, and shows how each departure 
favors the PPP option. Finally, it shows how the UK approach might be augmented to 
determine the best value to society. 
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Introduction  
Many governments have used public-private partnerships (PPPs) to provide new public 
infrastructure across a range of sectors, including healthcare, education, prisons, defence and 
transport. Between 2004 and 2015, EU governments entered into PPPs with a total capital 
value of €222 billion (EPEC 2015); and such contracts are also a prominent feature of US 
investment programs at the state and federal levels (Istrate and Puentes 2011). Governments 
are drawn to PPPs for many reasons, including their ability to address the so-called 
“infrastructure deficit” without adding immediately to official measures of public spending. 
In the provision of new infrastructure, the term PPP applies to a long-term contract 
between a government entity and a consortium of private companies. For each new project, 
the private partners typically establish a special purpose vehicle (SPV) which manages the 
design, build, financing, operation (sometimes) and maintenance of the facility.1 Thus, the 
private sector provides an extensive bundle of services. Another key feature is that the 
government transfers some of the risks associated with project delivery to the SPV. In return, 
the consortium receives an income stream from the government and/or service users, 
contingent on the specified infrastructure and services being available and/or their usage. 
This paper focuses on new infrastructure, not asset-monetization concessions in which 
existing infrastructure assets currently owned by government are sold or leased to the private 
sector. However, the same principles apply to the evaluation of all types of PPPs. 
Where government authorities can engage in PPPs, they need to supplement the 
traditional investment decision (whether to undertake the project or not) with a procurement 
route decision. This paper assumes that the project has been approved and focuses on the 
latter decision, that is, whether to procure the project via a PPP or via traditional government 
                                                            
1 An SPV is a separate legal entity that is formed specifically to deliver a particular project, and limits 
the financial liability of the parent companies if unexpected costly events occur or in cases of default. 
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procurement. There is general acceptance among scholars and practitioners that this decision 
should be based on which option provides the best ‘value for money’ (VfM) (Farquharson et 
al. 2011). In VfM analysis, the present value (PV) of the expected total whole-life costs 
incurred by government of a PPP is compared to that of an equivalent (but usually 
hypothetical) project in which financing and management are provided by the public sector. 
The latter is usually referred to as the ‘public sector comparator’ (PSC). A PPP is judged to 
provide VfM if the PV of its expected whole-life cost is lower than that of the PSC. 
Many governments have set-up specialist PPP units (henceforth PPP units), either as 
separate organizations or as dedicated agencies within national finance ministries. Although 
the roles and functions of these units vary, they usually include the structuring and/or 
execution of VfM analyses. This paper examines and compares the methodologies employed 
in eight countries by nine such units that describe their VfM methodologies in public 
documents.  
Many authors have noted that governments prefer PPPs to traditional procurement for 
various reasons, ideological and political. Boardman, Siemiatycki and Vining (2016) discuss 
five such reasons. First, governments may believe that the scope of private control is greater 
than in traditional procurements, and this is likely to lead to greater efficiency in 
infrastructure supply (Pollitt 2002). Second, PPPs reduce downside risk from government’s 
perspective, which provides political benefits. Indeed, one of the often-stated benefits of a 
PPP is that project risks are shifted to the party “best able to manage them” and that projects 
are more likely to come in “on time and on budget”. Third, government might want to curry 
favour with financiers and consultants (Hellowell 2010). Firms that deliver PPP services – 
including major banks, civil engineering firms and consultants - are often major contributors 
to political parties, and have significant lobbying power. Fourth, PPPs may circumvent 
government’s borrowing constraints, even in cases where PPPs generate debt-like obligations 
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(Irwin 2012). Fifth, and related to the previous point, governments can “rent to own”, that is, 
provide infrastructure now but defer the costs until the future. Thus, governments have 
incentives to adopt appraisal methodologies that skew the outcome in favor of PPPs. 
The following sections draw on finance theory and cost-benefit analysis theory to 
show how VfM analysis should be conducted in order to achieve specific government goals.  
We first show how to conduct the analysis if the goal is to maximize the value to government, 
that is, to minimise the PV of the (net) financial cost to the Ministry of Finance, Treasury or 
the Exchequer (henceforth the Treasury). Then, we show how to conduct the analysis if the 
goal is to maximize the value to society, that is, to maximise allocative efficiency or the PV 
of the net social benefits. The correct way to perform VfM varies with these goals. Next, we 
describe and compare VfM methodologies among PPP units set up by governments in nine 
jurisdictions. Presuming that the goal is to maximize value to the Treasury, we identify four 
important modifications to the correct approach, each of which is used in at least one 
jurisdiction, and all of which favor the PPP over the PSC. Finally, we show how the UK 
method might be adjusted to correctly determine which option will maximize the value to 
society. 
 
Value for Money Analysis from the Treasury’s Perspective 
In private-sector investment decision-making, the net financial cash flows and returns to an 
investment are usually positive. For new infrastructure projects, however, the cash flows and 
financial returns are usually negative from the government’s perspective. Instead of trying to 
maximize negative cash flows (i.e. make them less negative), it is more intuitively appealing 
to conduct the analysis in terms of minimizing costs. The UK’s National Audit Office (2013, 
p. 23), for example, has argued:  “it seems reasonable that any decision about whether to use 
[a PPP] for a given project ought to consider whether [this route] is the cheapest way to the 
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exchequer of doing that project.” Consistent with this statement, this section assumes that the 
goal of VfM analysis is to minimize the PV of the whole-life costs to the Treasury. Given this 
goal, and drawing on standard capital budgeting theory, the annual costs to the government of 
each option should be discounted at the risk-free rate adjusted for the systematic risk to 
government of that alternative (Berk and DeMarzo 2013). The rationale for this approach is 
provided in the sub-section below on adjusting for risk. 
 
Estimating (Net) Financial Costs 
There is broad agreement about how the government’s cash costs should be estimated before 
taking account of risk and making adjustments for other factors (discussed below). For both 
the PPP and PSC, the costs are initially estimated with reference to similar recent projects, 
and these estimates may, in some cases, be adjusted during the procurement stage as bids are 
received and PPP units obtain better information about market prices for various activities.2 
Prior to discounting, costs are estimated for the year in which they are expected to 
occur. The annual costs to the Treasury of the PPP vary depending on its “form”.3  In the 
most common situation, the government’s costs are specified contractually in advance. We 
refer to this form of PPP as ‘availability-based’ because the payments are made to the SPV 
as, when, and to the extent that the specified assets and services are made available to 
government (and service users). In the less common situation the government pays the SPV a 
‘shadow toll’ based on usage. We refer to this form of PPP as ‘usage-based’ because 
payments depend on the use of assets. In either case, and for the PSC, the estimated annual 
costs are subsequently adjusted for transaction costs.  
                                                            
2 In some countries, such as France and the UK, the analysis is conducted prior to the procurement process and 
is not repeated thereafter. 
3 The SPV’s net cash flows may vary with some characteristics of the SPV, such as the SPV’s debt structure and 
its cost of capital, which may change over time. However, from the Treasury’s financial perspective, the only 
relevant costs for VfM analysis are those that it incurs. 
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These costs are also adjusted for financial inflows to government. For example, there 
may be adjustments for corporation tax, VAT and for user fees received by government, 
although government rarely (if ever) receives user fees in the situations we consider. In any 
case, although we refer to costs, strictly speaking they are net costs.  
 
Adjusting for Risk 
The actual costs of each option are unknown ex ante and, therefore, need to be adjusted for 
risk. Usually, analysts identify different outcomes (or scenarios) for the PPP and PSC and 
attach probabilities to each outcome, resulting in a distribution of the PVs of the costs under 
each alternative. The PVs used in VfM analyses are the means of these distributions. By 
definition, total risk (or just risk) is the variance of this distribution.  
There are two distinct components of total risk: systematic and non-systematic risk. 
Non-systematic risk applies to a specific project and can be eliminated through 
diversification. Governments engage in thousands of different programs. The net benefits or 
returns to a particular project are positively correlated with some projects and negatively 
correlated with others. By spreading the risk over a broad portfolio of different projects, 
governments eliminate non-systematic risk. Thus, the risk of any one project can and should 
be ignored for the purposes of determining the discount rate.   
In contrast, systematic risk applies in some degree to all assets in a portfolio. It 
depends on the covariance between a project’s net benefits (here, cash flows) and financial 
returns to the market overall. As systematic risk applies to all holdings in a portfolio of assets, 
it cannot be reduced by diversification and the discount rate of each option should be adjusted 
for the systematic risk for that option. From the Treasury’s perspective, the systematic risk of 
an option depends on the correlation between the financial returns to Treasury associated 
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with that option and the return on a perfectly diversified portfolio. This correlation will vary 
according to the type of PPP.  
For an availability-based PPP, government’s costs are independent of market 
conditions as they are based only on the SPV’s performance in ensuring availability of the 
assets and delivering services at agreed standards. Thus, the financial costs and the returns to 
government are uncorrelated with market returns. Consequently, in this case, the Treasury 
bears no systematic risk and the costs should be discounted at the risk-free rate.  
For a usage-based PPP, the correlation between the financial returns to the Treasury 
and market returns is likely to be negative for projects that provide normal goods (for which 
demand rises as income increases). Most road infrastructure projects with no tolls, for 
example, are normal goods. As economic conditions (and market returns) increase, traffic 
flows are likely to increase. As the usage-based payments to a PPP increase, the Treasury’s 
costs will increase and its financial returns will decrease. Therefore, the systematic risk of 
this PPP from the Treasury’s perspective is negative and its cash costs should be discounted 
at a rate lower than the risk-free rate. Consequently, the PV of the costs will be larger than if 
the costs were discounted at the risk-free rate and the procurement method will be estimated 
to provide less VfM and is less likely to be selected, holding all else constant. This result may 
appear counter-intuitive because the likelihood of adopting this alternative decreases as the 
systematic risk decreases. However, the usage-based payments made by the Treasury are 
risky in the sense that they are positively correlated with economic conditions and, consistent 
with intuition, it would want to reduce the likelihood of pursuing this option. 
In contrast, some social infrastructure projects, like hospitals, prisons and perhaps 
some schools, may be inferior goods and have fewer patients, prisoners or students as 
aggregate income increases. If government makes usage-based payments for a PPP that 
provides an inferior good, the economy improves and market returns increase, its cash costs 
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would decrease, and its financial returns would increase. Therefore, the systematic risk is 
positive and the PPP cash costs should be discounted at a higher rate than the risk-free rate. 
This result is also consistent with intuition: the Treasury’s usage-based payments are not 
risky in the sense that they are negatively correlated with economic conditions and, consistent 
with intuition, the Treasury would want to increase the likelihood of pursuing this option. 
Now consider the cash costs paid by government for a traditional procurement, 
represented by the PSC. The government may not enter a fixed-price construction contract 
and it would be unusual to have long-term, fixed-price contracts for operations, maintenance 
and related activities. These costs depend on labor wages and equipment costs, which are 
likely to be positively correlated with market returns (i.e. they will increase as economic 
conditions improve). Usage will also affect costs and financial returns. For a normal good, 
demand will increase and the costs of inputs will increase as general economic conditions 
improve. Consequently, there is likely to be a positive correlation between the annual 
operating costs and market returns, and a negative correlation between government’s 
financial returns and market returns. Therefore, these PSC’s cash costs should be discounted 
at a lower rate than the risk-free rate. For an inferior good, input prices may increase but 
usage of the facility and the quantity of some inputs may decrease as economic conditions 
improve. The net impact on financial returns is ambiguous but is not likely to be large. 
Therefore, these costs should be discounted at a rate close to the risk-free rate, possibly 
slightly higher. These results are summarised in Table 1. 
 ***Insert Table 1 about here***  
It is instructive to compare the correct discount rates for different procurement 
options. Comparing the columns in Table 1, for a usage-based PPP that provides a normal 
good, the Treasury’s costs should be discounted at a similar or lower rate than that used to 
discount the costs of a PSC. This result differs from Grout (2003) who argues that a higher 
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rate should be applied to costs of a PPP for a normal good.4  In contrast, the costs to Treasury 
of a usage-based PPP that provides an inferior good should be discounted at a higher rate than 
the costs of a PSC. For an availability-based PPP that provides a normal good, the Treasury’s 
costs of a PPP should be discounted at the same or a higher rate than that used to discount the 
costs of a PSC. In contrast, the costs of an availability-based PPP that provides an inferior 
good should be discounted at a lower rate than the costs of a PSC.  
 
Adjusting the Estimated Costs for Optimism Bias 
The actual costs of a project may be higher or lower than expected. If the costs are estimated 
objectively, then over a large number of projects there should be little deviation between the 
average actual cost and the average expected costs, that is, the estimates should be unbiased. 
Sometimes, however, there is consistent under-estimation of costs, which is a type of 
optimism bias (Krause, Lewis and Douglas 2013). Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius and Rothengatter 
(2003) and others have found that the cost of government infrastructure projects - especially 
large projects - are routinely over-estimated. This evidence provides a rationale for adjusting 
the expected costs upwards ex ante, especially the costs of the PSC. 
Optimism bias is an estimation issue, not one of risk, and the two issues should be 
treated separately. Rather than adjusting costs by an arbitrary amount, a better way to handle 
this problem is for analysts to improve their cost estimation abilities in order to obtain an 
unbiased estimate of the expected cost of each alternative. Analysts should specify the 
possible outcomes carefully and attach realistic probabilities, based on contemporary 
                                                            
4 Grout (2003) incorrectly defines systematic risk in terms of the covariance between revenues or 
costs and aggregate income rather than in terms of the covariance between net benefits and aggregate 
income or between the returns to the investment (procurement option) and the returns (i.e., growth) in 
aggregate income. Also, he focuses on the operating period and ignores construction risks. 
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evidence. Outcomes should reflect the possibility of failure, not just cost over-runs, but 
bankruptcy and default. The probabilities of these events should be estimated accurately. 
 
Value for Money Analysis from Society’s Perspective 
The key normative criterion for most government decision-making is allocative efficiency. 
PPPs relate to such areas as custodial services, defence, education, healthcare, and transport 
that are subject to market failures. Government intervention is commonly justified on the 
grounds that it can address market failures to the benefit of society as a whole (i.e. enhancing 
social welfare or, more narrowly, allocative efficiency). Consistent with this, PPP units 
generally acknowledge that the investment decision (i.e. whether to engage in a particular 
project) should be made at least in part on the basis of allocative efficiency (see, for example, 
Infrastructure Australia 2008a, p. 17). It seems reasonable that the procurement route 
decision should also be made on this basis.  
The VfM to society as a whole can be estimated by discounting the annual net social 
benefits (i.e. social benefits minus social costs) associated with each procurement option at 
the social discount rate (SDR), which reflects the social opportunity cost of capital, not the 
government’s cost of borrowing.5 The SDR is the relevant discount rate because social 
welfare concerns the utility that individuals (or a representative individual) obtain from 
consumption, and is the rate at which individuals are willing to trade-off consumption now 
for consumption in the future.  
 
Adjusting for Risk 
In theory, the correct way to handle risk in government policy evaluation is to convert risky 
outcomes to their certainty equivalents and then discount the certainty equivalents at the risk-
                                                            
5 See, for example, Boardman et al. (2010). Note, however, that social costs are opportunity costs, not 
financial costs. 
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free social discount rate (Gollier 2012).6 However, computing certainty equivalents is rarely 
practical. We propose an alternative approach that is similar to the standard approach to 
capital budgeting discussed above, except that it focuses on net social benefits (and social 
returns), not net financial benefits (or financial returns). Again one must consider non-
systematic and systematic risk, but from the perspective of society as a whole, not the 
Treasury. Since the government and other agents in society provide a wide range of services 
whose returns are not highly correlated, non-systematic risk is eliminated by diversification 
and can be ignored (Arrow and Lind 1970). Systematic risk from society’s perspective, which 
we refer to as social systematic risk, depends on the correlation between the net social 
benefits of an option and aggregate net social benefits (i.e. consumption) or, equivalently, on 
the correlation between the social returns of an option and aggregate social returns (i.e. the 
growth in consumption).7 The SDR should be adjusted up when the net social returns to a 
project procured in a particular way are positively correlated with growth in aggregate 
consumption (or general economic growth) and adjusted down when the net social returns are 
negatively correlated with growth in aggregate consumption.  
The net social returns for a new infrastructure project are likely to depend more on the 
nature of the project itself than on how it is procured and, therefore, the net social benefits of 
a PPP and a PSC should generally be discounted at a similar rate. Suppose the economy is 
growing. For either a normal good or an inferior good, the social (opportunity) cost of the 
resources employed in a project will increase, which will reduce the net social returns. For an 
inferior good the social benefits will also decline. Therefore, for an inferior good, the social 
systematic risk is likely to be negative, whether procured as a PPP or a PSC, and the discount 
                                                            
6 Suppose one faces a risky decision and one is indifferent between that decision and receiving (or 
paying) an amount CE with certainty. CE is the certainty equivalent of the risky decision. 
7 Hansen and Lipow (2013) incorrectly propose the adjustment should be based on the correlation 
between each cost or benefit and consumption instead of the correlation between the net social 
benefits and consumption. 
 
11 
 
rate should be lower than the SDR. For a normal good, however, the use of the infrastructure 
will increase, and the social benefits will therefore rise (as will the social costs). On balance, 
the net social returns are probably (slightly) positively correlated with consumption growth, 
and the project will have positive social systematic risk, whether procured as a PPP or a PSC. 
Thus, the net social benefits of each option should be discounted at a rate (slightly) higher 
than the SDR. 
 
Comparison of Value for Money Methods Used by PPP Units 
This section describes and compares the VfM appraisal methods used in nine jurisdictions, 
namely: Australia, British Columbia (BC) in Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, the 
Netherlands, Ontario in Canada, South Africa, and the UK.8 In Australia, BC and Ontario, the 
appraisal methods are designed and implemented by statutory bodies (namely, Infrastructure 
Australia, Partnerships BC and Infrastructure Ontario) that are arm’s length from government 
departments and are staffed by professional specialists (Rachwalski and Ross 2010). The 
roles of these agencies vary, but they usually have a mandate to promote PPPs and are, 
therefore, sometimes referred to as PPP ‘supporting units’ (Van den Hurk et al. 2015). In 
contrast, in Ireland, France, Germany, South Africa, the Netherlands and the UK, dedicated 
agencies are within national finance ministries - although they, too, are often staffed by 
individuals with private sector origins and expertise (OECD 2010).  
Table 2 provides an overview of the key characteristics of the VfM appraisal 
methodologies adopted in each jurisdiction. Clearly, there is no agreement among 
jurisdictions about how VfM analysis should be conducted. Eight of the nine jurisdictions 
                                                            
8 The discussion of the UK approach focuses on its operation until December 2012, when the 
“quantitative tool” was withdrawn by the UK Treasury. The UK Treasury has stated that it intends to 
introduce updated VfM guidance while retaining a similar theoretical framework (National Audit 
Office 2013), but this had not been published as at this writing.  
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(i.e., all but the UK) initially discount the annual costs to government of both procurement 
options at a financial discount rate (i.e., based on the government’s borrowing rate or the 
SPV’s cost of financing, that is, the project’s Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC). 
Then they adjust the annual cash costs or the resultant PVs for the risks associated with that 
option. These actions suggest that these jurisdictions aim to determine which option provides 
the most VfM to the Treasury. In contrast, the UK discounts at the SDR and does not adjust 
the costs or the PV of the costs for risk. Thus, it appears that the UK, in contrast to other 
jurisdictions, attempts to determine which option provides the most VfM to society. The UK 
also differs from the other because it explicitly adjusts the estimated costs for optimism bias.  
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
 
The Choice of Discount Rate by PPP Units 
France, Germany, Ireland, Ontario and South Africa use a discount rate which is referenced 
to the interest rate on the bonds issued by the government of the jurisdiction (Central PPP 
Unit 2006, Infrastructure Ontario 2007, National Treasury (South Africa) 2004). Usually, the 
rate is that on bonds with the same term to maturity as the project itself.9 This is considered to 
be a risk-free rate. Infrastructure Ontario (2007, p. 15) explains its use of this rate on the 
grounds that the government can borrow “virtually unlimited” amounts of money at that rate.  
In contrast, the Netherlands and British Columbia determine the systematic risk of a 
project from the perspective of the special purpose vehicle (SPV). They use the capital asset 
pricing model to estimate the WACC of the SPV. The approach in British Columbia varies 
depending on the stage of procurement at which the analysis takes place. Before tendering 
commences, its approach is the same as that of the Netherlands (Ministry of Finance 
                                                            
9 South Africa may add a risk premium to this rate when “it is not possible to reflect the effect of all 
risks in cash flow estimates” (National Treasury (South Africa) 2004, p. 22). 
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(Netherlands) 2013; Partnerships BC 2011). However, once a preferred bidder is appointed, 
the bidder’s cost of capital is used. This rate is used to discount the costs of both alternatives 
for a particular project. Partnerships BC (2011, p. 26) rationalizes this approach by 
emphasizing the importance of “correctly formulating the problem facing government as an 
asset portfolio investment problem” – a rationale that we examine in detail in sections below.  
In Australia, for projects with no systematic risk, the predicted costs of both the PPP 
and the PSC are discounted at the risk-free rate. However, where cash flows are exposed to 
systematic risk, a risk premium is added to the discount rate applied to the PPP. In 
Infrastructure Australia’s (2008b) methodology, this premium is always positive and can vary 
from 1.8 percent for availability-based projects, such as hospital facilities, to 3.0 percent for 
water, transport and energy projects, and 5.4 percent for telecommunications, media and 
technology projects, in which usage-based payments (and user fees), which are likely to be 
affected by economic conditions, provide a greater component of the revenue stream. 
 
Adjusting Financial Costs for Risk Transferred 
Eight of the jurisdictions adjust the annual costs or the PV of the costs for the risk transferred 
to the PPP. In an illustrative example, Infrastructure Australia (2008a, p. 141) values the risks 
transferred to the SPV as 25 percent of the cost of the risk-adjusted PSC (36% of the cost of 
the raw PSC). Infrastructure Ontario adjusts the costs of both options, but makes a far greater 
adjustment on average to the total cash costs of the PSC (58 percent) than to those of the PPP 
(11 percent) (Siemiatycki and Farooqi 2012).   
 
Adjusting for Optimism Bias 
In the UK, larger adjustments for optimism bias are applied to the PSC because it is assumed 
that the risk transfer mechanisms relating to the latter serve to limit the public sector’s 
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exposure to cost increases attributable to optimism bias (HM Treasury 2011). These 
adjustments can be large. For example, in a recent hospital PPP, adjustments for optimism 
bias increased the estimated capital (construction) and operating costs of the PSC by 19 
percent and 16 percent, respectively (The Royal Liverpool and Broadgreen University 
Hospital NHS Trust 2010).  
 
Amendments that Favor the PPP over the PSC 
Because different jurisdictions use different appraisal methods, they may reach different 
conclusions about whether the PPP or the PSC procurement option provides the best VfM. 
Empirical evidence, however, shows that the overwhelming majority of VfM analyses 
undertaken find in favor of the PPP (Winch and Onishi 2012). In light of the different 
methods being used in the different jurisdictions, the consistency in outcomes is surprising. 
This section illustrates how the methodologies used by PPP agencies tend to favor the PPP 
over the PSC and discusses how they differ from the theoretically correct method assuming 
the goal is to determine which option has the best VfM from the Treasury’s perspective. 
This illustration assumes that the government is deciding whether to procure new 
infrastructure that provides a good that is neither a normal good nor an inferior good. It will 
be procured as an availability-based PPP or a PSC. If procured by a PPP, it would be 100% 
financed by the private sector. It ignores transaction costs and assumes there are no positive 
financial inflows. If the project were undertaken as a PSC, it assumes government would 
incur construction (including design) costs of $115 million per year for three years and would 
then pay annual operations (including maintenance) costs of $24 million per year for the life 
of the PPP contract (30 years). In contrast, suppose the PPP would be more efficient and its 
annual construction and operations costs would be only 90 percent of those of the PSC. 
Assuming that the SPV extracts no rents, its real WACC is 6 percent and that it receives 
15 
 
compensation for construction as an annuity over the 30-year life of the contract, government 
would pay $23.94 million per year for 30 years for construction. Suppose, further, 
government would pay the SPV $21.6 million per year for operations.10  
In this situation, according to Table 1, the annual cash costs of both procurement 
methods should be discounted at close to the risk free rate, which we assume is 2.5 percent 
(real). The PV of the costs to the Treasury of the PSC and the PPP would be $801 million and 
$891 million, respectively, as shown in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3. Thus, the PSC would 
provide $90 million more VfM than the PPP. Two points are worth making. First, this VfM 
analysis is conducted from the perspective of Treasury, which does not consider the risks 
borne by taxpayers or other costs (or benefits) borne by society as a whole; it considers only 
its own financial position. Second, the main reason the PV of the cost of the PSC is less than 
that of the PPP is because the Treasury’s financing cost is lower than the SPV’s financing 
cost. In order to reach the opposite conclusion—that PPPs provide more VfM than PSCs 
from Treasury’s perspective, PPP units employ some modifications, which we now discuss. 
***Insert Table 3 about here***  
The first modification concerns the discount rate. PPP units in Australia, British 
Columbia and the Netherlands adjust the discount rate upward to reflect the systematic risk 
borne by the SPV. From the Treasury’s perspective, most of the costs of the PSC are 
concentrated in the early years of the project, in which construction is paid for as the work 
proceeds, while the costs of the PPP are amortised over 25-30 years. Hence, discounting 
reduces the costs of a PPP more than those of the PSC, and a higher rate favours the former 
over the latter. The results are illustrated in Columns (3) and (4) in Table 3, which show that 
                                                            
10 These illustrative costs are loosely based on Partnerships BC’s analysis of the new Abbotsford 
Hospital (Auditor General of British Columbia 2005). 
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if the costs of both alternatives are discounted at a real rate of 6%, then the PPP is found to 
provide VfM of $79 million.11    
The second modification relates to discounting the costs paid to the SPV at a higher 
rate than the PSC’s costs. Infrastructure Australia (2008a, p. 3) recommends this on the 
grounds that more systematic risk is transferred to the PPP. Suppose for illustrative purposes 
that a PPP unit discounts the PSC’s costs at the risk-free rate as in column (1) but discounts 
the amounts paid to the SPV at the SPV’s WACC as in column (4); then, the VfM of the PPP 
rises to $269 ($801-$532) million. It is appropriate to use different discount rates for different 
procurement methods if the systematic risk varies from the perspective of the Treasury. 
However, discounting the SPV’s costs at a higher rate than the PSCs costs will, as shown in 
Table 1, be incorrect for an availability-based PPP project that provides an inferior good or 
for a usage-based project that provides a normal good.  
The third modification relates to larger positive adjustments to the PSC’s costs or the 
PV of these costs than to the costs of the SPV for the transfer of risk to the SPV. All PPP 
units except the UK adopt this approach. Assume, as is representative of practice in Ontario 
and illustrated in Columns (5) and (6), that the cost of the PSC is adjusted upwards by 58 
percent ($461 million) and the cost of the SPV is adjusted upwards by 11 percent ($97 
million). Now the PPP provides VfM of $274 million. Siemiatycki and Farooqi (2012) argue 
that such risk transfer is critical in tipping the balance in favour of PPPs in Ontario. 
A key question is whether such risk transfer provides benefits to the Treasury. If costs 
are discounted as in Table 1, there is no financial reason to make any further adjustments for 
risk. Doing so would be equivalent to taking out insurance on each PPP project. In principle, 
                                                            
11 Several authors argue that the cost of government’s funds should reflect the risk of default, which is 
borne by taxpayers (Boyer, Gravel and Mokbel 2013; Lucas 2014). However, Treasury’s costs depend 
on the rate it has to pay for funds. Risks borne by taxpayers or any other segment in society do not 
directly affect Treasury’s decision-making if its goal is to minimize its costs. 
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to minimise the Treasury’s costs, governments should self-insure, just as most individuals do 
when they buy a particular stock for their portfolio.  
 The fourth modification relates to adjustments for optimism bias. None of the 
jurisdictions that use a financial discount rate explicitly do this. However, Column (7) 
illustrates the impact of assuming that the PSC costs are underestimated by 15 percent. Now 
the PPP would provide VfM of $23 million. The current UK optimism bias adjustment is 
based on a study by a technical advisory firm within the PPP industry (Mott MacDonald 
2002) which has been the subject of extensive criticism. For example, Pollock, Price and 
Player (2007) raised concerns about the non-comparability of the projects included in the 
study, the small sample size, and numerous sources of measurement bias. If optimism bias 
adjustments are applied, it is clearly important to base them on objective, high quality and, as 
far as possible, contemporary data. If this is not the case, the legitimacy of the adjustment is 
in question.  
This illustrative example highlights some important ways in which jurisdictions 
modify their VfM analyses, all of which advantage PPPs over PSCs.12 Some jurisdictions 
employ a combination of these modifications. For example, BC, the Netherlands and 
Australia, use risk-adjusted discount rates and make further adjustments to the costs for risk, 
both of which favour the PPP over the PSC; and in the latter case, a higher discount rate is 
sometimes applied to the PPP, such that the advantage is compounded.  
 
The UK Method as a Way of Determining Value from Society’s Perspective 
                                                            
12 Another way that PPP units may improperly advantage PPPs is by incorrectly estimating transaction 
costs. Vining, Boardman and Poschmann (2005) argue that the government’s transaction costs are 
generally higher for PPPs than for PSCs, but PPP unit VfMs often assume they are equal.  
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As discussed earlier, one way to calculate value from society’s perspective is to discount the 
benefits and the (opportunity) costs at the SDR adjusted for social systematic risk if 
necessary. An alternative, equivalent approach is to consider the impacts on users 
(consumers), producers (including consultants and bankers), employees and government 
(Treasury). More specifically, analysts could use cost-benefit analysis to estimate consumers’ 
surplus, producers’ surplus, employees’ surplus and government surplus, computed by 
discounting the relevant impacts at the SDR (Boardman et al. 2010).  By definition, the UK 
approach to VfM, which discounts the Treasury’s net financial costs at the SDR, provides an 
estimate of (minus) government surplus. This approach would provide an estimate of the 
difference in the social value between the procurement options if producer, consumer and 
employee surpluses did not differ.  
However, producer surplus is likely to be higher for a PPP than for a PSC. Failure to 
include it in the analysis, therefore, is likely to bias VfM analysis towards the PSC from a 
social welfare perspective. Perhaps for this reason the UK finds it necessary to make such 
large adjustments for optimism bias. By definition, producer surplus equals the difference 
between the amount that a supplier or factor of production receives for a unit supplied and the 
marginal cost of supplying that unit (integrated over the units supplied). It is a form of 
Ricardian rent and is analogous to what are often called ‘supernormal profits’ or ‘excess 
returns’ (Hellowell and Vecchi 2012). There has been little research on the magnitude of 
producer surplus in PPPs, partially because estimation is difficult. If all of relevant markets 
were perfectly competitive then produce surplus would be zero. However, markets for the 
provision of PPPs are generally oligopolistic due to high barriers to entry (Colla et al. 2015) 
and, therefore, some producers may generate considerable rents. Producer surplus that 
accrues to consultants and financiers should also be included in the estimation of benefits.  
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It is important, however, to take account of only benefits (or costs) to producers with 
standing – those considered to be part of the defined society whose welfare is to be included 
in estimating benefits. Some goods and services may be supplied by companies based outside 
of the relevant (typically national) geographical boundary. If so, then no weight should be 
given to benefits (or costs) accruing to these companies. 
 The PPP and PSC may also differ in terms of consumer surplus. For example, the cut-
and-cover technology used on the underground part of the Canada Line in Vancouver made it 
possible to build the high speed rail stations closer to the surface. Relative to the PSC, access 
by transit users was easier, but it was far more disruptive to traffic during the construction 
period and had a significant adverse impact on retailers in the surrounding area. Some 
consumer impacts are sometimes acknowledged in procurement route decisions outside of the 
quantitative analysis. For example, Partnerships BC recommended a PPP for the Sea-to-Sky 
Highway, even though it cost was more than for the PSC, on the grounds that it contained 
improvements that would result in additional time savings and reduced accident risks. It 
would be more transparent to estimate such consumer surplus benefits as part of the analysis.  
  
Conclusion 
This paper describes how VfM analysis should be conducted if the goal is to determine the 
best value to the Treasury and how it should be conducted if the goal is to determine the best 
value to society. It explains how to properly adjust for risk under either goal, correcting 
prescriptions in the existing literature. Specifically, to determine the best VfM from the 
Treasury’s perspective, the costs of each alternative should be discounted at the risk-free rate 
adjusted for systematic risk from the perspective of the Treasury. This paper explains how 
this adjustment should vary according to whether the infrastructure provides a normal good 
or an inferior good and according to the provision option and type (whether the PPP is 
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availability based or usage based). To determine the best value from society’s perspective the 
social benefits and the opportunity costs should be discounted at the SDR adjusted for social 
systematic risk. 
This paper then reviews and compares the procurement route appraisal methodologies 
applied in a variety of jurisdictions with documented VfM procedures. It shows that even if a 
PPP provides and operates infrastructure with greater technical efficiently than the PSC, VfM 
analysis conducted correctly from Treasury’s purely financial perspective will generally 
conclude that the PSC provides greater VfM. This outcome conflicts with many ideological 
and political goals of governments. However, perhaps in order to achieve the “right answer”, 
PPP units modify their VfM procedures in various ways. We focus on four such 
modifications and illustrate how each one favors the PPP, thus leading to incorrect decisions 
about the most appropriate procurement method. The financial cost to governments many run 
into billions of dollars. 
 Even if VfM analysis is conducted correctly from the Treasury’s financial 
perspective, this approach may conflict with the normative goals of government, specifically 
maximizing social welfare or allocative efficiency. One way to take account of this goal is to 
use cost-benefit analysis to calculate and sum consumer, producer, employee and government 
surpluses, using the SDR to calculating PVs. The UK’s VfM methodology estimates 
government surplus. However, if the proper goal of government is to determine which 
procurement route offers best value to society, more attention needs to be paid in the 
appraisal process to the other surpluses, and to producer surplus in particular.  
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Table 1 
Appropriate Discount Rates Assuming the Goal is to Minimize the PV of the Cost to the 
Treasury 
 
 
  Availability-based PPP Usage-based PPP PSC 
Normal 
Good 
Discount the SPV's 
annual cash costs at the 
risk-free rate 
Discount the SPV's 
annual cash costs at a 
lower rate than the risk-
free rate 
Discount the PSC's fixed 
annual cash costs at the risk-
free rate and others at a 
lower rate 
Inferior 
Good 
Discount the SPV's 
annual cash costs at the 
risk-free rate 
Discount the SPV's 
annual cash costs at a 
higher rate than the risk-
free rate 
Discount the PSC's fixed 
annual costs at the risk-free 
rate and others at a slightly 
higher rate. 
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Table 2 
The Major Differences in VfM Appraisal Practices in Jurisdictions with Institutionalized PPP 
Programs 
 
Jurisdiction Discount rate 
Adjust the 
cash costs or 
PVs for risks 
transferred 
Adjust the 
PSC's cash 
costs for 
optimism bias 
Australia 
Each procurement method's 
risk-free rate, adjusted for 
systematic risk Yes No 
British Columbia, Canada PPP's WACC Yes No 
France Government borrowing rate Yes No 
Germany Government borrowing rate Yes No 
Ireland Government borrowing rate Yes No 
Netherlands PPP's WACC Yes No 
Ontario, Canada Government borrowing rate Yes No 
South Africa Government borrowing rate Yes No 
UK Social discount rate No Yes 
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Table 3 
Illustrative Impacts of Adjustments to VfM Analysis by Specialist PPP Units that Favor PPPs  
 
 
Costs of 
PSC 
Discounted 
at the 
Risk-Free 
Rate (1) 
Costs of 
SPV 
Discounted 
at the 
Risk-Fee 
Rate (2) 
Costs of 
PSC 
Discounted 
at the PPP's 
WACC (3) 
Costs of 
SPV 
Discounted 
at the 
SPV's 
WACC (4) 
Costs of the 
PSC 
Discounted at 
the Risk-Free 
Rate and 
Adjusted for 
Risks 
Transferred 
(5) 
Costs of the 
PPP 
Discounted 
at the Risk-
Free Rate 
and 
Adjusted for 
Risks 
Transferred 
(6) 
Costs of the 
PSC 
Discounted 
at the Risk-
Free Rate 
and 
Adjusted 
for 
Optimism 
Bias (7) 
Construction Costs        
Construction Costs (Yrs 1-3) 115 104 115  115  132 
PV (Construction Costs) 328 465 307 277 328 465 378 
Operation Costs        
Operating Costs (Yrs. 4-33) 24 22 24 22 24 22 28 
PV (Operating Costs) 466 420 298 250 466 420 536 
PV (Total Costs excluding risk transfer) 795 885 605 526 795 885 914 
VfM of PPP (excluding risk transfer)   -90   79   -90 29 
Value of Risk Transferred to SPV  0  0 461 97 0 
VfM of PPP   -90   79   274 29 
 
